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Greening cultural policy 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article focuses on greening cultural policy within a sustainable development 
context. We examine shortcomings of major public-policy responses to the 
ecological crisis, linking this to the ambivalent philosophical heritage of 
anthropocentric worldviews that underpin ideas about the relation of culture to 
non-human nature. This ambivalence is reflected by weak environmentalism in the 
cultural policy arena, exemplified by surprisingly non-green cultural platforms 
espoused by green political parties. Green thinking is further hampered by the 
widespread adoption of digitisation within cultural organizations, which we 
contextualise in the broader political economy of digital capitalism and the 
attendant myth that high-tech culture is a low emissions business. Green cultural 
policy necessitates intensive self- examination of cultural institutions’environmental impact, at the same time these institutions deploy art, 
education, entertainment, sports, and news to raise awareness of ecological 
crisis and alternative models of economic activity. We cite the efforts of activist artists’ resistance against fossil fuel corporations’ sponsorship of arts and 
cultural organizations as a welcome provocation for greening cultural policy 
within cultural organizations and green political parties alike. 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is in keeping with work we have done over the past twenty-five years 
that sidesteps the customary separation of plastic or hanging art and performance 
from screen drama, sports, or news (Miller 1993; Maxwell 1995; Lewis and Miller 
2002; Miller and Yúdice 2002; Maxwell and Miller 2012). We also disobey the norms 
that situate policy in a separate, fetishized category, apart from their incarnation in 
programs and organizations. For us, the actual conduct of institutions – whether 
Hollywood studios, journalists’ unions, or museums of fine art – is as relevant a form 
of cultural policy as, for example, a set of cultural principles adopted by governments. 
Once we situate these forms of cultural policy in the context of the ecological crisis, 
the need for green cultural practices and policy should become self-evident. 
After a synopsis of today’s major public-policy responses to the ecological crisis, 
we examine the ambivalent philosophical heritage of anthropocentric and eco-
centric worldviews that underpin ideas about the relation of culture to non-human 
nature. This sets the stage for a look at the contradictory manner in which 
environmental issues are discussed in the cultural policy arena, exemplified by 
cultural platforms espoused by green political organizations. We then describe how 
a variety of industries  in the cultural sector have confronted – or need to confront 
– their environmental impact. The last two sections suggest key areas where 
cultural organizations and green political parties might begin to green cultural 
policy. We focus our discussion successively on the digitisation of cultural 
organizations, contextualized in the broader political economy of digital capitalism, 
and on activist art resistance against the complicity of cultural institutions with the 
extractive industries. 
 
The wider problem 
Since the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference (UNCCC), carbon 
emissions have risen 10% worldwide. That figure is a disheartening reminder that 
the 195 (potential) signatory nations to the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change may have set their benchmarks well below the recommendations of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): the reduction of 20 billion tons 
of carbon emissions within twenty years and seven billion tons by 2050. These are 
the panel’s most minimal estimates of what should be done. And while the outcome 
of the 2015 Paris UNCCC cannot yet be fully assessed, the world’s most powerful 
politicians and bureaucrats have already failed to direct their economies toward a 
sustainable future. That calls into question not just their will to act on global 
warming, but their very capacity to reason with the scientific consensus about it 
(Pollin 2015). 
Part of the problem is that ideas of sustainability have become thoroughly 
muddled by political and economic ideologies of growth. Despite the scientific 
consensus that ‘warming of the climate system is unequivocal’ (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change 2007, 72), the twenty leading economic powers 
frequently treat climate change and other ecological hazards as one-more variable 
of international relations, ignoring decades-old warnings about the fast-closing 
circle of remedies for environmental ills (Commoner 1971). This is one of the most 
volatile contradictions of our time: whereas the interpretation of economic, social, 
and cultural needs is fraught with political conflict and requires negotiations at 
multiple scales of global governance, the ‘scientific prerequisites for ecological 
sustainability’ are not a matter of political debate over values or priorities: ‘nature 
does not conduct consensus talks’ (Schauer 2003, 3–6). Building in ambit claims 
or indulging in game theory may work in human negotiation, but not climate 
change. 
And yet meeting upon meeting of peak councils of labour, capital, and the state 
inexorably depart from the lessons of science and towards immediate self-interest. 
In the terminology of ecological ethics, we might say that a dominant 
anthropocentric aspiration insists on managing environmental risks in ways that 
prioritise established human interests. This dominant paradigm is opposed by an 
eco-centric, inter-generational interest in future lives and ecosystems. The former 
emphasises the overarching legitimacy of human interests, the latter the necessity 
of preserving Earth’s complexity. 
Public policy responded better in the past than today to calls for absolute pre- 
and proscriptions based on evidence of ecological decline – consider US clean-air-
and-water policies of the 1970s – or the use of a precautionary principle in the 
development of new technology or production practices rather than their 
enthusiastic application followed by cost-benefit analysis after the fact/disaster. 
We are all familiar with the discourse of costs and benefits as a common-or-
garden orthodoxy of mainstream policy analysis that weighs up the positive and 
negative aspects of actions, based in large part on what they have produced already 
in related or identical contexts. By contrast, the precautionary principle holds that‘ 
our knowledge of the effects of our actions is always exceeded by our ignorance.’ It 
lays the burden of proof of value and safety on those who would introduce potentially 
toxic substances or dangerous practices into the environment in circumstances 
where there is no scientific consensus about the consequences of such actions 
(Curry 2006, 48). 
We have a scientific consensus and clear mandates for policies that promote 
sustainable development, that is, the efficient use and equitable distribution of 
natural resources for long-term, intergenerational socioeconomic wellbeing. 
Ideally, the term denotes a standard that ‘rules out all practices except those that 
are indefinitely sustainable’ by the Earth’s ecosystems (Curry 2006, 48). The virtues 
of sustainable development are that it accounts for intra- and inter-generational 
equity; allows for openparticipation, if not directly by all affected communities, then 
at least by their representatives; and is recognised in international agreements for 
assuring a certain inter-territorial equity. 
But sustainability is still commonly deployed to signify an uneasy and frankly 
irresponsible balance between socioeconomic development and environmental 
protection. The contradictions inherent in sustainable development emerge at the 
point at which quantitative economic development overtakes other concerns. In its 
weakest form, sustainable development becomes ‘little more than “sustainable” 
capitalism’(Pepper 2000, 451). Economic self-interest pushes eco-ethical self-
interest into a little corner of sustainability. Herein lies a key vulnerability of 
anthropocentric eco-ethics. Self-interest that does not perceive the intimate relation 
between human and nonhuman beings tilts the balance toward the satisfaction of 
human needs. 
The role of culture 
Into this struggle for utilitarian public interest comes culture, itself long-straddling 
pragmatic and ethereal, anthropological and aesthetic definitions and norms, and 
subject to a relationship to the natural world that is exemplified in struggles over 
ecological ethics. A complex philosophical heritage underpins artistic ambivalence 
about transforming the old into the new: anthropocentric and eco-centric 
worldviews. From an anthropocentric point of view, Bacon avowed four centuries 
ago that ‘commerce between the mind of man and the nature of things … is more 
precious than anything on earth’ (1620). Two hundred years later, Hegel argued that 
semiosis is the distinctive quality of humans. It elevates them above other life forms: 
making meaning is evidence of a beautiful and sublime human quality – putting one’s 
‘will into everything.’ An object or place thereby ‘becomes mine. ’As a consequence, 
humans, alone among the Earth’s inhabitants, have ‘the right of absolute 
proprietorship. ’A capacity to restrain ourselves, mastering both ‘spontaneity and 
natural constitution,’ distinguishes people from other living things. The inevitable 
relationship between humanity and nature asserts itself at the core of 
consciousness as a site of struggle for ‘us’ to achieve freedom from risk and want. 
We are unique in our wish and ability to conserve and represent objects, so a 
strange dialectical process affords us the special right to destroy them. This 
willpower distinguishes us from other animals because it expresses the desire and 
capacity to transcend subsistence. Semiotic power legitimizes the destruction of 
unmarked sites, ones that lack human signage: ‘respect for … unused land cannot 
be guaranteed. ’Nature’s ‘tedious chronicle’ provides ‘nothing new under the sun’– 
valueless without the progress signified by human dominion (Hegel 1954; 242–243, 
248–250 and 1988, 50, 154, 61). Hence the anti-indigenous, anti-flora, anti-fauna 
doctrine of terra nullius – among the most powerful of imperial cultural policies – 
which denied native title to indigenous people due to their ideological and 
pragmatic lives, which were meant to be harmonised with nature rather than 
transformative of it.1 
Conversely, Hume approached these matters from an almost eco-centric 
persuasion: even if rights are only accorded to those with semiotic abilities, animals 
deserve them, too, because they ‘learn many things from experience’ and develop 
‘knowledge of the nature of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths, etc.’ Rather 
than being merely sensate, our fellow creatures infer material truths (1955, 112–113) 
through what he called ‘the reason of animals’ (1739). 
The duality of nature – that it is simultaneously self-generating and sustaining, 
yet its survival is contingent on human rhetoric and despoliation – makes it 
vulnerable, even as its reaction to our interference will strike back sooner or later 
in mutually-assured destruction: no more nature, no more humanity, no more art. 
As a consequence, sacred and secular human norms conflict as often as they 
converge in accounting for changes in the material world and the rights of humanity 
as its most skillful and willful, productive and destructive inhabitant. As Latour 
explains: 
From the time the term ‘politics’ was invented, every type of politics has been 
defined by its relation to nature, whose every feature, property, and function 
depends on the polemical will to limit, reform, establish, short-circuit, or 
enlighten public life.  
This necessitates allocating equal and semi-autonomous significance to natural 
phenomena, social forces, and cultural meaning in order to understand 
contemporary life. Just as objects of scientific knowledge come to us in hybrid forms 
that are coevally affected by social power and textual meaning, so the latter two 
domains are themselves subject to the natural world (Latour 1993, 5–6). This is 
why museums focused on nature are encased within imperial domination and 
industrialisation as well as scientific knowledge, and tightly linked to the Global 
North’s colonising and classifying tendencies over peoples and places (Barrett and 
McManus 2007). Half of the two hundred million objects housed in British museums 
fall into this category (Alberti 2008, 73). 
Policy implications 
Art and custom are now resources for markets and nations, reactions to the crisis 
of belonging and economic necessity occasioned by capitalist globalisation. They 
are crucial to advanced and developing economies, and provide the legitimizing 
ground on which particular groups (e.g. African Americans, lesbians, the hearing-
impaired, evangelical Protestants …) claim resources and seek inclusion in national 
and international narratives (Yúdice 2003). 
Cultural industries are getting bigger, with global trade in the culture products 
increasing from US$559.5 billion in 2010 to US$624 billion in 2011, for example 
(United Nations 2014). Unsurprisingly, then, questions of the value of cultural 
production have morphed into questions of economic development, employment, 
and diversity of access and ownership. A corollary change in terms of cultural policy 
shifts the emphasis to culture as a fount of economic growth, but one with a far less 
harmful environmental impact than heavy industry and agriculture. Sustainability in 
this context is about positioning ‘clean’ creative and cultural sectors alongside other 
sectors within the dynamic core of the capitalist economy. 
For example, the European Commission defines cultural and creative industries 
as an economic growth sector, with emphases on education, artists ’mobility, 
regulatory reform, and market access and investment.2 With the aim to win a place 
for‘ culture-led development’ in sustainability debates, UNESCO promotes culture 
as a fourth pillar of sustainable development, an idea that elevates creative industries 
to equal partnership with stakeholders working to balance economic growth, social 
inclusion, and environmental health. Importantly, this has little to do with seeking 
environmental sustainability within the cultural sector (United Cities and Local 
Governments 2010; UNESCO 2012; United Nations 2014). 
This view of culture as environmentally benign is not limited to cultural policy 
organizations charged with championing cultural institutions. Surprisingly, it also 
thrives in political organizations dedicated to environmental well-being. Consider 
the cultural-policy platforms of major green parties in 2015. In Germany, Canada, 
New Zealand, and the UK, the Greens’ cultural policy focuses on identity, heritage, 
institutions, funding, ownership participation, and involving artists and other cultural 
workers in sustainable practices and ideas.3 The US Green Party lacks a cultural 
policy, except in relation to mainstream media channels, again with an emphasis on 
democratic principles, access, ownership, and so on.4 
While culture is a keyword in Green Party efforts to meet sustainability goals, 
policy platforms are primarily focused on resisting the dominance of commercial 
culture and the hyper-consumerism that undermines local participatory culture – a 
laudable goal, but perversely exclusive of any reference to the real environmental 
impact of cultural practices. Such a policy discourse reinforces the misleading idea 
that a movement for ecologically sustainable development has no role to play in 
the realm of cultural production or artistic practice. 
In fact, internal practices of cultural production have social liabilities that directly 
affect the environment – not in an ideological, expressive, or discursive way, but in 
the material practices of making, distributing, and consuming culture. These effects 
derive from materials and energy used to produce movies, performance, and 
institutional preserves of culture, heritage, and language; the atmospheric effects 
of digital consumption; and the waste generated by producers and consumers 
alike. Not even California’s Green Party has acknowledged the material ecological 
problems of making culture, and this with evidence of massive pollution caused by 
LA-based film and TV production on its doorstep.5 
 
Problems for green cultural policy 
Green institutional initiatives face many challenges associated with energy 
consumption and conservation, design and manufacturing processes of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), working conditions 
throughout the global supply chain, and e-waste. The bulk of these problems pre- 
sumably reside outside the cultural sector, but they are not disconnected, a fact even 
major Green Parties are ignoring. If cultural policymakers connected upstream and 
downstream environmental liabilities to the costs of cultural production, they 
might identify unexpected ways to incorporate environmental accounting into their 
advocacy efforts, shaping policies that direct non-government, private, and 
government management protocols to reinforce sustainable practices within the 
cultural sector itself. There are already hundreds of accords that aim to protect 
workers, waterways, plant and animal life, fisheries, archaeological and other 
cultural-environmental heritage, and atmospheric and ground air quality through 
the regulation of waste management, trans-border flows of heavy metals, airborne 
and waterborne pollutants, forests, nuclear energy, and exported hazardous 
waste. These local, regional, national, and global ecological policies can inform 
cultural policy where they intersect with matters of climate change, pollution, 
biodiversity, and habitat. Here are a few examples of environmental issues 
in which a green cultural policy could play a bigger role. 
Making books makes pollution. The production of pulp and paper causes a 
relatively well-known burden on the environment – deforestation, chemical 
effluents, emissions, toxic working conditions in printing plants, and so on 
(National Geographic n. d). Cultural policy could resolve confusion among the 
patchwork of certification programs claiming to ensure responsible paper use that 
can sustain forests – there are about fifty such systems in play, with a handful 
routinely used in the US, for example (Maxwell and Miller 2012, 127). 
Movies have a carbon footprint. Like papermaking, filmmaking is energy-
intensive and prone to waste and use of materials containing known toxins. As 
noted above, Hollywood productions are among California’s principal polluters 
(Corbett and Turco 2006). Cultural policy in this area has been captured largely by 
the industry itself, with studios, producers’ organizations, trade organizations, and 
other private entities involved in greening production practices. These industry 
actions are meant to substitute for independent policy oversight of this sector 
(Maxwell and Miller 2012, 83–84), increasing the probability that they never 
become more than various forms of ‘greenwashing,’ a public relations strategy to 
add environmental credibility to industries and thereby stave off regulation. Cultural 
policy could act as a watchdog to assess the claims of the sector against the actual 
environmental record of its operations. Meanwhile, the electronic media provide a 
complex collection of significant environmental problems energy consumption and 
emissions, materials sourcing and toxicity, and electronic waste. There are 
between ten and fifteen billion high-tech devices needing electricity today, and 15 
percent of global residential energy is spent powering domestic digital technology. 
If energy demand continues to grow at this rate, the residential electricity needed 
to power electronics will rise to 30 percent of global consumption by 2022, and 45 
percent by 2030 (International Energy Agency 2009). When residential use is 
added to the electricity it takes to make and distribute these goods, the total 
energy consumed translates into carbon emissions that are about the same as 
current levels from aviation – and this does not account for the energy to make 
chemicals and gases that go into the production of semiconductors or the energy 
used to dispose or recycle the devices. Cultural policy doesn’t currently address 
high-energy profiles of digital cultural production, an area of significant importance 
to green cultural policy-making. 
This is only a glimpse of some of the problems cultural policymakers will face 
were they to begin to generate positions and research that considers cultural 
practices in the context of sustainability benchmarks. Each problem arose in a 
particular historical context of emerging intersections of politics, economics, and 
technology. Today they are all subsumed in vital ways by market criteria 
associated with digital capitalism. The most obvious sign of this shift in the cultural 
sector is the incorporation of non-profit cultural institutions via digitisation of 
administration and operations. Digital technology now permeates the all forms of 
culture – in the technology used to make culture, administer and operate cultural 
institutions, and consume their output (Maxwell 2015). 
 
Digital capitalism and cultural policy 
In the US and the UK, the most powerful non-profit arts organizations all invest 
heavily in moving towards digitisation in various ways. This transformation can be 
understood as a matter of survival in a world where the public’s cultural affections 
are increasingly focused on commercial electronic screen content. Behind the 
rhetoric justifying digital schemes lie external pressures, including diminishing 
benefactor support, rising electronic consumption/participation relative to on-site 
arts programming, and the breathtaking uptake of mobile devices – tablets, 
smartphones, notebooks, and laptops. This has contributed the lion’s share of 
global spending on consumer electronics, which reached US$1 tril- lion for the first 
time in 2012. As this occurred in the wake of the worst economic crisis since the 
1930s, it reinforced the idea that digital investments are immune to recession and 
offer a lifeline to cultural institutions who have few alternatives to engage with 
consumers entranced by digital entertainments (‘Gartner Says’ 2013). 
Unsurprisingly, a flurry of excitement about digitisation can be found in the way arts 
and cultural groups are promoting these technologies as enhancements of on-site 
exhibition and performance, on-line distri- bution, promotion, and as catalysts for 
enlarging stand-alone digital art collections and exhibitions. The more successful 
cultural institutions are distinguished by their ability to, among other things, 
‘crowdfund’ and sell digital commodities – mobile applications, electronic books, music, 
recorded performances, games, etc. – as well as physical goods via online retail. And 
virtually all British arts and cultural organizations report high levels of confidence in 
digital systems as drivers of growth, innovation, and consumer outreach. That makes 
for the continued investment and deployment of more and more digital technology, 
with a vanguard of ‘cultural digerati’ leading the laggards into the future (Digital R&D 
Fund for the Arts 2013). 
While it is vital for these institutions to increase attendance and participation in 
an era of increased governmental/neoliberal surveillance, it’s also expensive to do 
so with digital systems, which are not simply installed then safely forgotten. On-line 
marketing schemes using social media, for example, must be well-designed, 
maintained, and upgraded. They require ongoing expenditure on hardware and 
software as well as investment in training existing staff or hiring employees who are 
adept at operating these systems. As digitisation consumes more and more of 
cultural institutions’ revenue, digital technology introduces the same bias in cultural 
and arts provision that we’ve seen in businesses and non-profits like universities. 
Among other characteristics, this includes a greater share of administration 
controlled by enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems with locked-in 
partnerships for database management and performance audits. Only a handful of 
ERP systems offer services addressed to non- profit operations (mostly education 
and government) though all are hungry for this business.6 In most cases, this 
method foists institutional roles and functions designed for businesses onto staff 
whose work has traditionally been organised and assessed by non-business 
criteria. The shift also entails a greater monetization of audience value: size of 
attendance, internet views, and click-throughs become more important than 
measuring the social significance of arts organizations as, for example, public 
goods that sustain cultural infrastructure beyond the fickle nature of market whimsy. 
Finally, digitisation encourages arts and culture administrators and artists 
themselves to endorse educational changes to meet the demand for skilled high-
technology workers within ‘their’ organizations. This exemplifies one of the latest 
instances of a sixty-year trend of ‘corporate educational provision’ of workers 
‘suitably trained’ for digital capitalism and all that this brings with it: a back door 
allowing training of ‘human capital’ inside public institutions, with ‘vocational 
objectives,’ precarity, and the reproduction of system-serving routines (Miller 1993; 
Schiller 1999, 204–205 and 2016). This education/employment dimension is 
critical: just as digitisation via online sales, marketing, and audience analytics is 
perceived as a crucial means of raising revenue, the digitisation of training in the 
arts and cultural sector – increasingly in university programs of digital humanities 
and the like – proposes dramatic, untested changes in the way we are asked to 
teach, interpret, and measure the value of artistic and cultural resources. Digital 
technology is not a neutral set of tools that benignly build up arts and culture. It 
comes loaded with ideological baggage and a dismal record of toxic harm to the 
environment and workers. 
Digitisation also raises environmental concerns that existing cultural policies 
have ignored, in particular its relation to energy consumption, health risks, and e-
waste. Museums, for example, tend to be electricity hogs and poor partners in 
recycling efforts (Museum Association 2008, 4). Digital technologies can reduce 
energy consumption through light-emitting diodes and ‘smart’ air-quality and 
temperature controls, but audience and visitor attraction through ICTs stimulates 
energy use, waste, and long-term environmental harm. 
The performing arts range in size and complexity, but many scenarios require 
lots of energy and produce lots of waste, neglecting reuse and recycling routines 
– problems that multiply with touring. Of course, there are green artists keen to 
change these dirty practices, but sustainability seems easier to foster in small-scale 
productions (Beer 2012). Attempts to green these activities at national levels has 
shown some success, but bureaucrats in charge of these programs still tend to 
enter digital solutions on the plus side as presumptively sustainable practices. 
Environmental harm that occurs beyond the confines of these organizations’ 
immediate operations is easy to ignore or treat as peripheral to such greening 
strategies. 
And as long as we don’t see the smokestacks and pollution that accompany 
electricity needed for digitisation, high-wattage operations of digital networks, office 
equipment, and video displays can be sold as clean, environmentally benign 
technologies (‘Managing Energy’ 2011). But these systems are plugged into the 
utility grid, which makes them part of a global problem of climate change mentioned 
above (International Energy Agency 2009). 
Moreover, enormous amounts of data pass daily through massive networks and 
data centres – the ‘cloud’ – now scattered across the globe. Data centres’ energy 
demands rise at a steady pace, with business practices that range from serious 
plans to reduce reliance on coal-fired energy to widespread examples of waste and 
thoughtless energy management. At current levels, cloud computing eats up 
energy at a rate somewhere between what Japan and India consume (Greenpeace 
2012). The environ- mental impact of this networked culture depends on the type of 
energy production used to power the grids – coal-fired power being the biggest 
menace. 
Cultural organizations that increase content provision to mobile devices have 
joined another unsustainable trend. There are nearly fourteen billion networked 
mobile devices in use worldwide today. But we’re not just talking about people 
following map directions to the theatre or museum. Wireless connectivity 
consumes a tremendous amount of electricity – up to 90 percent of the total energy 
consumed by mobile telecommunication connections (Center for Energy Efficient 
Telecommunications 2013; Maxwell and Miller 2013). 
Rising resistance against dirty corporate sponsorship 
Cultural policy can also challenge cultural organizations to divest from 
sponsorship deals with fossil fuel corporations. Over the past decade, BP has 
dedicated much of its public relation efforts to glossing its reputation as one of 
Britain’s principal cultural institutions, boasting that it ‘has proudly supported arts 
and culture in the UK for over 35 years’8 (Chase 2010; Reynolds 2012). In the 
US, BP paid the Los Angeles County Museum of Art US$25 million in 2007, in 
return for which the Museum christened a BP Grand Entrance.9 When one of the 
its oil rigs exploded in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, BP quickly with- drew much of 
its marketing in the US and UK. Still, the company felt no compunction about 
retaining its offer to name the ‘BP Sea Otter Habitat’ at the Long Beach’s 
Aquarium of the Pacific, which opened a month after the spill (though the oily 
sponsors failed to show up at the opening, perhaps in order to avoid 
acknowledging negative externalities and protests) (Boehm and Sahagun 2010; 
Reynolds 2012).10 BP also participates in more overtly ideological activities, 
notably through educational programs at Britain’s Science Museum, where school 
students are encouraged to embrace the wonders of energy generation via ‘an 
interactive game where visitors play the energy minister and have to efficiently 
power a make-believe country by balancing economic, environmental and political 
concerns before the prime minister fires them’ (Viney 2010). The game sets up 
BP and the Science Museum as reasonable actors  capable of a measured and 
fair-minded engagement and positions the firm as a benign intermediary between 
present and future, science and childhood, truth and innovation. 
Chevron in Colombia endeavours to promote the country’s cultural development 
[‘promover el desarrollo cultural de Colombia’], by sponsoring exhibits like the one 
at the Museo del Gas de Riohacha that explores pre-invasion and colonial 
settlements and the ongoing cultures of indigenous peoples, such as the Wayúu 
(‘Ficha Técnica’ 2013). The reality is that Chevron disrupts the Wayúu’s form of life, 
who have protested.11 
Like the Wayúu, cultural policy could become more alert to real environmental 
harms caused by embedded cultural practices of fossil fuel corporations involved in 
arts and cultural sponsorship. A green cultural policy could also draw on the lessons 
of activists and artists who have mounted spectacular forms of resistance to 
corporate greenwashing, rethinking culture as a ground of struggle in both its 
objects of critique and its self-reflexive tactics. 
RisingTide UK’s Art Not Oil project takes as its motto: ‘For creativity, climate 
justice & an end to   oil industry sponsorship of the arts’ (Rising Tide 2012). Since 
2004, RisingTide UK has challenged art- ists to work in sustainable ways as they 
work against the unsustainability of Shell, BP, and their kind, by undermining their 
greenwashing efforts in arts sponsorship. Art Not Oil operates on-line galleries 
designed to criticise and undermine ‘the caring image’ propagated by corporate 
polluters (for example, BP’s Portrait Award and Shell’s exhibit of ‘Wildlife 
Photographer of the Year’ at Britain’s Natural History Museum). These activists 
want to see ‘Big Oil’ go ‘the way of Big Tobacco in being unwelcome in any gallery, 
museum, opera house or theatre.’12 
This is much more than an issue of consumerism. It is about large institutions and 
their place within international and national power élites, drawing on minimal, cheap 
sponsorship to gloss their image and win goodwill from the public while maintaining 
oligarchical ties. Hence the Tate’s Director, Nicholas Serota, avowing during the spill 
of the year before that ‘You don’t abandon your friends because they have what we 
consider to be a temporary difficulty’ (quoted in Liberate Tate, Platform, and Art Not 
Oil 2011, 12). 
There are many other examples of artists and performers fed up with 
greenwashing efforts of fossil fuel corporations: Reclaim Shakespeare Company’s 
critique of the British Museum’s complicity with its ‘Out Damn Logo’ flash mob;13 
‘Good Crude Britannia’ and the ‘Greenwash Guerrillas;’14 and Toronto’s artist-run 
Whippersnapper Gallery featuring Brazilian street artists creating gigantic urban 
sculptures from garbage (Kocialkowska 2012;‘Activistas y artistas’ 2010; Bain and 
McLean 2013, 107). The Liberate Tate group mounted several intense actions using 
spectacle to highlight the museum’s sycophancy to polluters,15 including the 
notorious simulacrum of oil dripping over a cringing, abject artist on the floor of the 
Tate where BP’s proud ‘Single Form’ exhibit, dedicated to the human body, took 
place (‘Human Cost;’‘Repudian artistas’ 2011). They followed this a year later with 
‘Floe Piece,’ a street performance in which they lugged fifty-five melting kilos of 
Arctic ice from Occupy London on the steps of St Paul’s Cathedral to the Tate’s 
Turbine Hall (Culture Beyond Oil 2011, 19; Anderson 2012; Lam et al. 2013).16 After 
years of pressure, Tate Modern and BP ended their partnership, without admitting a 
causal relationship to these protests, but it is reasonable to assume that either or 
both of these institutions decided that damage had occurred to their reputations, 
singly or collectively (‘Cuatro museos’ 2011; Khomami 2016). 
Conclusion 
It is a positive sign that certain segments of the cultural industries have pursued 
strategies and design innovations in response to the eco-crisis, rather than denying 
its existence. Meanwhile, green arts activists are raising awareness of the harmful 
game behind corporate sponsorship that uses cultural partners to divert attention 
from environmental despoliation resulting from corporate misconduct. Arts activist 
groups opposed to greenwashing have shown us all a way forward. And there is 
clearly a link between attempts to counter the economic crisis and the struggle 
against global warming through publicly-funded programs that shift investment to 
green practices in the cultural sector, including where companies have moved to 
renewable sources of energy generation such as solar, wind, and biomass and 
reduce energy consumption by retrofitting buildings. 
However progressive and lasting these initiatives prove to be, the defining 
political economy of digital capitalism has been very effective in hampering the 
ability for green thinking to flourish in the cultural arena. As we’ve seen, a vanguard 
of cultural organizations in the US and UK are expanding the footprint of digital 
technologies by promoting them as drivers of growth, innovation, and consumer 
outreach without regard for their ideological influence or environmental impact. The 
traditional role of public culture is being reshaped to fit enterprise management 
systems, while arts administrators and other cultural leaders buy into the idea that 
this is all clean and environmentally benign – a position that disavows growing 
evidence of carbon emissions owing to the mobile electronics and high-wattage 
network operations that underpin digitized arts exhibition, promotion, and audience 
analytics. 
Cultural policy has yet to take a position of leadership on these matters. This is 
reflected most alarmingly by the platforms of major Green Parties and major 
cultural institutions. It’s time that cultural policy become an environmental policy 
and not just a side-lined player in the global movement for sustainable 
development. 
It can do this by encouraging state and non-state policy-making that fosters 
conditions in which green cultural practices can thrive in arts and cultural 
organizations. This is one goal of IMAGINE 2020, a network of eleven European 
arts organizations funded by the European Union to reorganize cultural industries 
to meet the challenges of the ecological crisis, asking how the arts and cultural 
sector can make ‘changes necessary to stabilise the climate and secure a 
sustainable future’ (IMAGINE n. d.). Green cultural policy must also press for 
environmentally truthful bookkeeping in the cultural sector by factor- ing in eco-
system and atmospheric liabilities associated with all operations, from architecture 
to corporate sponsorship to digitisation of cultural practices, performance and 
exhibition. The time has come to reform old business accounting practices that fail 
to add the environmental costs into the bottom line of artistic and cultural 
industriousness. To measure the true value of cultural institutions, we must see 
them as vital environmental participants with a stake in the future of the planet and 
all its inhabitants. 
 
Notes 
1. http://www.migrationheritage.nsw.gov.au/exhibition/objectsthroughtime/bourk
eterra/. 
2. http://ec.europa.eu/culture/policy/cultural-creative-industries/index_en.htm. 
3. http://www.gruene-bundestag.de/service-
navigation/english/culture_ID_377806.html; http://www.greenparty.ca/ en/policy-
background-2015/part-l; https://home.greens.org.nz/policysummary/arts-culture-
and-heritage-policy- summary; https://policy.greenparty.org.uk/culture,-
media-and-sports.html. 
4. https://www.greenparty.org/Platform.php. 
5. http://www.cagreens.org/platform/arts-and-culture. 
6. http://erp-software.findthebest.com/. 
7. This section draws in part from Ahluwalia and Miller 2014. 
8. http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/bp-worldwide/bp-united-
kingdom/bp-in-the-community/ arts-and-culture.html; 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/investors/BP_Annual_Report_and_F
orm_20F_ 2012.pdf. 
9. http://www.lacma.org/sites/default/files/bpgef.pdf. 
10. http://www.aquariumofpacific.org/exhibits/northern_pacific_gallery/otters. 
11. http://www.fundaciongasnaturalfenosa.org/es-
ES/MuseoGas/Paginas/subhome.aspx http://chevrontoxico.com/ take-
action/colombia; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5RKr2NKdsgQ. 
12. http://www.artnotoil.org.uk/about. 
13. http://www.britishmuseum.org/whats_on/past_exhibitions/2012/shakespeare_
staging_the_world.aspx. 
14. http://greenwashguerrillas.wordpress.com. 
15. http://liberatetate.wordpress.com/liberating-tate/about/). 
16. http://platformlondon.org/2014/01/24/shell-no-longer-sponsoring-southbank-
classic-series-a-timeline/. 
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